0x00 前言
学习下最近爆出的Dubbo漏洞。
0x01 漏洞原理
Dubbo Provider即服务提供方默认使用dubbo协议来进行RPC通信,而dubbo协议默认是使用Hessian2序列化格式进行对象传输的,但是针对Hessian2序列化格式的对象传输可能会有黑白名单设置的限制,参考:https://github.com/apache/dubbo/pull/6378
针对这种场景,攻击者可以通过更改dubbo协议的第三个flag位字节来更改为使用Kryo或FST序列化格式来进行Dubbo Provider反序列化攻击从而绕过针对Hessian2反序列化相关的限制来达到RCE。
0x02 影响版本
- Dubbo 2.7.0 to 2.7.8
- Dubbo 2.6.0 to 2.6.9
- Dubbo all 2.5.x versions (not supported by official team any longer)
0x03 环境搭建
https://github.com/apache/dubbo-spring-boot-project
下载2.7.3版本,添加Dubbo-Common依赖:
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| <dependency> <groupId>org.apache.dubbo</groupId> <artifactId>dubbo-common</artifactId> <version>2.7.3</version> </dependency>
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注意,dubbo-common必须<=2.7.3版本。
0x04 漏洞复现
恶意FST/Kryo序列化请求构造工具:https://github.com/Dor-Tumarkin/CVE-2021-25641-Proof-of-Concept
冲:
0x05 调试分析
Kryo反序列化
在DecodeableRpcInvocation类的decode()函数中,通过serializationType为8、获取到反序列化器Kryo,然后调用readUTF()函数来读取dubbo协议对应的字段信息如dubbo协议版本、服务名称、服务版本、方法名、方法参数类型等:
提取方法参数类型为类数组后,再循坏对参数进行Kryo反序列化:
从input中读取解析到type为HashMap,因此会调用Kryo的MapSerializer序列化器来读取input中的信息:
其中会将解析到的key和value都通过调用map.put()来放入HashMap对象中,这里是有两对键值对放进去了:
往下putVal()函数中会调用key即XString类的equals()函数来判断两个key值是否相等:
这其中就会调用参数类的toString()函数,这里是com/alibaba/fastjson/JSON类的toString()函数,进而调用JSONSerializer的write()函数,从而触发Fastjson Gadget:
最后,就是TemplatesImpl链的触发点了:
此时函数调用栈:
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| getTransletInstance:455, TemplatesImpl (com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax) newTransformer:486, TemplatesImpl (com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax) getOutputProperties:507, TemplatesImpl (com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax) write:-1, ASMSerializer_1_TemplatesImpl (com.alibaba.fastjson.serializer) write:270, MapSerializer (com.alibaba.fastjson.serializer) write:44, MapSerializer (com.alibaba.fastjson.serializer) write:280, JSONSerializer (com.alibaba.fastjson.serializer) toJSONString:863, JSON (com.alibaba.fastjson) toString:857, JSON (com.alibaba.fastjson) equals:392, XString (com.sun.org.apache.xpath.internal.objects) equals:104, HotSwappableTargetSource (org.springframework.aop.target) putVal:635, HashMap (java.util) put:612, HashMap (java.util) read:162, MapSerializer (com.esotericsoftware.kryo.serializers) read:39, MapSerializer (com.esotericsoftware.kryo.serializers) readClassAndObject:813, Kryo (com.esotericsoftware.kryo) readObject:136, KryoObjectInput (org.apache.dubbo.common.serialize.kryo) readObject:147, KryoObjectInput (org.apache.dubbo.common.serialize.kryo) decode:116, DecodeableRpcInvocation (org.apache.dubbo.rpc.protocol.dubbo) decode:73, DecodeableRpcInvocation (org.apache.dubbo.rpc.protocol.dubbo) decodeBody:132, DubboCodec (org.apache.dubbo.rpc.protocol.dubbo) decode:122, ExchangeCodec (org.apache.dubbo.remoting.exchange.codec) decode:82, ExchangeCodec (org.apache.dubbo.remoting.exchange.codec) decode:48, DubboCountCodec (org.apache.dubbo.rpc.protocol.dubbo) decode:90, NettyCodecAdapter$InternalDecoder (org.apache.dubbo.remoting.transport.netty4) decodeRemovalReentryProtection:502, ByteToMessageDecoder (io.netty.handler.codec) callDecode:441, ByteToMessageDecoder (io.netty.handler.codec) channelRead:278, ByteToMessageDecoder (io.netty.handler.codec) invokeChannelRead:374, AbstractChannelHandlerContext (io.netty.channel) invokeChannelRead:360, AbstractChannelHandlerContext (io.netty.channel) fireChannelRead:352, AbstractChannelHandlerContext (io.netty.channel) channelRead:1408, DefaultChannelPipeline$HeadContext (io.netty.channel) invokeChannelRead:374, AbstractChannelHandlerContext (io.netty.channel) invokeChannelRead:360, AbstractChannelHandlerContext (io.netty.channel) fireChannelRead:930, DefaultChannelPipeline (io.netty.channel) read:163, AbstractNioByteChannel$NioByteUnsafe (io.netty.channel.nio) processSelectedKey:682, NioEventLoop (io.netty.channel.nio) processSelectedKeysOptimized:617, NioEventLoop (io.netty.channel.nio) processSelectedKeys:534, NioEventLoop (io.netty.channel.nio) run:496, NioEventLoop (io.netty.channel.nio) run:906, SingleThreadEventExecutor$5 (io.netty.util.concurrent) run:74, ThreadExecutorMap$2 (io.netty.util.internal) run:30, FastThreadLocalRunnable (io.netty.util.concurrent) run:748, Thread (java.lang)
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FTS反序列化
FTS反序列化也是类似的触发原理。
通过serializationType为9,获取到FST反序列化器进行反序列化操作:
在FST反序列化过程中,也是将反序列化后的键值对put到HashMap对象中:
往下是和Kryo一样的调用过程,即XString类的equals()函数中调用参数的toString触发Fastjson Gadget。
此时函数调用栈:
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| getTransletInstance:455, TemplatesImpl (com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax) newTransformer:486, TemplatesImpl (com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax) getOutputProperties:507, TemplatesImpl (com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax) write:-1, ASMSerializer_1_TemplatesImpl (com.alibaba.fastjson.serializer) write:270, MapSerializer (com.alibaba.fastjson.serializer) write:44, MapSerializer (com.alibaba.fastjson.serializer) write:280, JSONSerializer (com.alibaba.fastjson.serializer) toJSONString:863, JSON (com.alibaba.fastjson) toString:857, JSON (com.alibaba.fastjson) equals:392, XString (com.sun.org.apache.xpath.internal.objects) equals:104, HotSwappableTargetSource (org.springframework.aop.target) putVal:635, HashMap (java.util) put:612, HashMap (java.util) instantiate:79, FSTMapSerializer (org.nustaq.serialization.serializers) instantiateAndReadWithSer:497, FSTObjectInput (org.nustaq.serialization) readObjectWithHeader:366, FSTObjectInput (org.nustaq.serialization) readObjectInternal:327, FSTObjectInput (org.nustaq.serialization) readObject:307, FSTObjectInput (org.nustaq.serialization) readObject:102, FstObjectInput (org.apache.dubbo.common.serialize.fst) decode:116, DecodeableRpcInvocation (org.apache.dubbo.rpc.protocol.dubbo) decode:73, DecodeableRpcInvocation (org.apache.dubbo.rpc.protocol.dubbo) decodeBody:132, DubboCodec (org.apache.dubbo.rpc.protocol.dubbo) decode:122, ExchangeCodec (org.apache.dubbo.remoting.exchange.codec) decode:82, ExchangeCodec (org.apache.dubbo.remoting.exchange.codec) decode:48, DubboCountCodec (org.apache.dubbo.rpc.protocol.dubbo) decode:90, NettyCodecAdapter$InternalDecoder (org.apache.dubbo.remoting.transport.netty4) decodeRemovalReentryProtection:502, ByteToMessageDecoder (io.netty.handler.codec) callDecode:441, ByteToMessageDecoder (io.netty.handler.codec) channelRead:278, ByteToMessageDecoder (io.netty.handler.codec) invokeChannelRead:374, AbstractChannelHandlerContext (io.netty.channel) invokeChannelRead:360, AbstractChannelHandlerContext (io.netty.channel) fireChannelRead:352, AbstractChannelHandlerContext (io.netty.channel) channelRead:1408, DefaultChannelPipeline$HeadContext (io.netty.channel) invokeChannelRead:374, AbstractChannelHandlerContext (io.netty.channel) invokeChannelRead:360, AbstractChannelHandlerContext (io.netty.channel) fireChannelRead:930, DefaultChannelPipeline (io.netty.channel) read:163, AbstractNioByteChannel$NioByteUnsafe (io.netty.channel.nio) processSelectedKey:682, NioEventLoop (io.netty.channel.nio) processSelectedKeysOptimized:617, NioEventLoop (io.netty.channel.nio) processSelectedKeys:534, NioEventLoop (io.netty.channel.nio) run:496, NioEventLoop (io.netty.channel.nio) run:906, SingleThreadEventExecutor$5 (io.netty.util.concurrent) run:74, ThreadExecutorMap$2 (io.netty.util.internal) run:30, FastThreadLocalRunnable (io.netty.util.concurrent) run:748, Thread (java.lang)
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0x06 补丁分析
本地以2.7.9版本测试。
在高版本中已将com.esotericsoftware:kryo依赖去掉了,在使用Kryo序列化器进行反序列化获取KryoObjectInput对象时会报找不到KryoException类的错误:
添加上对应的依赖:
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| <dependency> <groupId>com.esotericsoftware</groupId> <artifactId>kryo</artifactId> <version>4.0.2</version> </dependency>
<dependency> <groupId>de.javakaffee</groupId> <artifactId>kryo-serializers</artifactId> <version>0.43</version> </dependency>
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其实就是CVE-2020-1948的补丁过滤拦截了:
而且,自带的Fastjson版本为1.2.70,AutoType会自动拦截掉TemplatesImpl类。
0x07 参考
The 0xDABB of Doom: CVE-2021-25641